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Abstract 
Natural hazards, human-induced accidents, and malicious acts have caused great losses 
and disruptions to society.  After September 11, 2001, critical infrastructure protection 
has become a national focus in the United States and is likely to remain one for the 
foreseeable future.  Damage to our infrastructures and assets could be mitigated through 
pre-disaster planning and actions.  We have developed a systematic methodology to 
assess and rank the risks from these multiple hazards in a community of 20,000 people.  
It is an interdisciplinary study that includes probabilistic risk assessment, decision 
analysis, and expert judgment. Scenarios are constructed to show how the initiating 
events evolve into undesirable consequences.  A value tree, based on multi-attribute 
utility theory, is used to capture the decision maker’s preferences about the impacts on 
the infrastructures and other assets.  The risks from random failures are ranked 
according to their Expected Performance Index, which is the product of frequency, 
probability, and consequence of a scenario. Risks from malicious acts are ranked 
according to their Performance Index as the frequency of attack is not available.  A 
deliberative process is used to capture the factors that could not be addressed in the 
analysis and to scrutinize the results.  This methodology provides a framework for the 
development of a risk-informed decision strategy.  Although this study uses the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology campus as a test-bed, it is a general methodology 
that could be used by other similar communities and municipalities.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, the 
thwarted attempt that resulted in the crashing of United Airlines Flight 93 in Shanksville, 
PA, as well as hurricanes Katrina and Rita remind us of the importance of mitigating the 
consequences of disasters.  Natural disasters, human-induced accidents, and malicious 
acts have great potential for death, injury, economic losses, and disruption of service to 
society.  The damage to infrastructures and assets could be mitigated through pre-
disaster planning and actions.  An important element to planning is the prioritization of 
risks according to criteria acceptable to the decision makers and the stakeholders.  
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has established the Disaster 
Resistant University (DRU) program whose purpose is to protect U.S. government 
investments in academic research and to protect the country’s higher education capability. 
Several universities have participated in this program including the University of 
California at Berkeley and the University of North Carolina at Wilmington (UNCW).  
The UC Berkeley study1,2 developed a scenario-based approach to assess the risk to the 
campus from earthquakes.  Three scenarios (magnitude 6.5, 7.0, and 7.5 on the Richter 
scale) were used to estimate the structural and non-structural losses (in dollars).  The 
conclusion was that non-structural losses dominated the structural losses.  Then, the cost 
of mitigation was evaluated by considering three attributes: life safety, value (i.e., the 
purchase price of the equipment), and importance (to research).  
 
The UNCW study3 addressed multiple hazards in their DRU project, including hurricanes, 
wildfires, earthquakes, tornadoes, and severe winter weather.  Multiple attributes were 
used to evaluate the potential impact from these hazards to people, property, and business.  
The hazards were ranked by the Hazard Priority Score, defined as the product of 
frequency and potential impact.  Qualitative scales were developed for each attribute, 
and the score for each attribute was given by faculty and staff. The study is based on 
subjective qualitative analysis rather than quantitative assessment.  
 
In addition to the DRU studies, methods for evaluating multiple hazards have been 
proposed in the literature.  A deliberative risk ranking method that describes the risks in 
multi-attribute terms employs groups of laypeople to perform the risk ranking4,5.  The 
authors used the Centerville Middle School and DePaul County as test-beds.  Multiple 
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risks were considered such as accidental injuries, airplane crashes, bites and stings, 
common infectious diseases, and lightning.  The methodology featured an iterative 
deliberative process in which each participant provided holistic and multi-attribute risk 
ranking individually, and then subjected his/her risk ranking to deliberation and revision 
through group interactions.  Several runs of the individual-group risk ranking process 
were implemented until the participants were satisfied.  Risk scenarios were not 
identified.  For example, the expected number of deaths per year was estimated directly 
and was used to represent the risk of death from a particular hazard. 
 
In the New Jersey Comparative Risk Project (NJCRP)6, the authors developed a hazard 
ranking methodology by sorting multiple environmental threats.  The NJCRP was 
designed to involve experts and stakeholders through focus groups, surveys, newsletters, 
open meetings, and a website.  This was a consequence-based approach containing 
multiple impact categories, i.e., human health, ecological, and socioeconomic. 
Deliberation was included in the process, but probabilities were not considered. 
 
The objectives of this paper are to develop a systematic methodology to assess and rank 
the risks from multiple hazards in a small community, and provide a framework for the 
development of a risk-informed decision strategy to understand and manage the risks. 
The hazards include natural hazards, human-induced accidents, and malicious acts. 
Natural hazards and human-induced accidents refer to the ones that happen 
probabilistically, and they can also be regarded as random failures.  Malicious acts refer 
to intentional attacks. In this study, vandalism, that is, intentional attacks on the 
infrastructures, is addressed.  Multiple infrastructures and assets as well as multiple 
stakeholders are included.  
 
This study was conducted for the campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) as part of the DRU program.  The MIT campus is a good representation of a 
community.  It can be considered a town with approximately 6,000 residents and 14,000 
commuters.  It operates a utility plant, data network, cable television station, phone 
system, and has its own police and medical personnel.  The method can be applied to 
many similar communities such as other academic research organizations located in 
similar settings as well as small municipalities.  
 
Section 2 shows the overall framework.  Section 3 addresses the details of the 
methodology.  In particular, Section 3.1 discusses hazard identification and screening, 
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followed by the classifications of critical infrastructures and assets, as is shown in Section 
3.2.  Section 3.3 introduces how scenarios are constructed using Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment.  Section 3.4 lists the steps used to collect data from the stakeholders 
through a formal expert elicitation process.  The impacts from the scenarios are 
evaluated by a hierarchical decision framework and are presented in Section 3.5. Section 
4 outlines the deliberative process used on the technical results.  Section 5 provides 
preliminary risk management strategies.  The contributions of the method and its 
limitations are discussed in Section 6.  
 
2 OVERALL FRAMEWORK 
 
The proposed method is scenario-based and involves the decision makers and the 
stakeholders in each step.  It implements and expands the analytic-deliberative process7. 
Figure 1 shows the overall framework of the methodology.  
 
The first step (bottom of the figure) is to gather data and information from a variety of 
sources.  Using the information, we screen out hazards, infrastructures and assets that 
are either addressed by other projects (“Do”) due to their significance, or are judged to be 
insignificant (“Do Not Do)”.  The screening is necessitated by the large number of 
hazards, infrastructures and assets that must be investigated.  
 
Second, using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques, scenarios are constructed 
for these infrastructures, assets, and hazards.  Each scenario starts from an initiating 
event and proceeds through a series of subsequent events to a number of undesirable 
physical consequences, i.e., the end states.  Since the infrastructures are interconnected, 
the dependencies among them are included in the scenarios.  
 
A preliminary ranking of the scenarios is achieved by using methods from Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory.  In particular, the objectives of the decision makers are 
represented in a “value tree,” as shown in Figure 1.  Disutilities measure the impact of 
the scenarios on these objectives.  The expected disutilities of the scenarios form the 
basis for a preliminary ranking, i.e., the higher the disutility the less desirable a scenario. 
The expected disutilities of scenarios emanating from natural events can be evaluated 
because their frequencies are known.  This is not the case for malicious acts and 
therefore other methods for ranking are developed.  
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The final risk ranking is determined through a deliberative process in which the results 
are evaluated by the decision makers and the stakeholders.  Based on this ranking, risk 
management alternatives can be proposed.  
 
 
Figure 1: Methodology Framework 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
The details of the methodology will be discussed referring to Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Overall Methodology  
 
3.1 Hazard Identification and Screening 
 
The following hazards may potentially present risks to a small community: 
• Natural Hazards: Earthquakes, Tornados, Hurricanes, Winter storms, Freezing, 
and Heavy rain  
• Human-Induced Hazards: Fires, Explosions, Internal flooding, Vandalism, 
Outbreaks of infectious diseases, and Cyber/IT attacks  
Here, internal flooding means the flooding due to broken water pipes, plugged drains, 
condensation, faulty plumbing, or sprinkler system failure; all internal to the building. 
Vandalism describes the malicious actions on the infrastructures that result in operation 
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disruption, property or facilities damage.  
 
The criteria for screening the hazards are:  
• Frequency: occurrence of events per year; 
• Severity: the consequence level due to the hazard; 
• Warning/Detectability: the extent to which warning information is available; 
• Awareness: how much work has historically been done to mitigate the hazard and 
the extent to which MIT grasps the damage due to the hazard 
• Importance: the extent of urgency or necessity of doing work to address the 
hazard; and, 
• Satisfaction: degree of personal acceptance of the level at which MIT is currently 
working to prepare for, respond to, or mitigate a potential hazard.  
 
Each hazard is compared against each of these six criteria, and evaluated using a 
subjective 0-4 scale (an example for the frequency of occurrence is shown in Table I). 
The objective of these criteria is not to find the exact scale for each hazard (detailed 
quantitative analysis will be done in the following steps) but to determine qualitatively 
the properties of all the hazards and screen out the hazards that are beyond the scope of 
the analysis.  For this reason, the criteria aim to provide a platform to the decision 
makers and enable them to develop an overview of the hazards.  Thus, each decision 
maker can select the hazards that should be screened out in his/her opinion.  After the 
screening, the decision makers discuss the hazards, and reach consensus on the hazards 
that do not require further analysis.  The results of this screening process are shown in 
Table II. 
 
 
Table I: Screening of Hazards Using Frequency 
Description Level 
High (occurs >3 times /year) 4 
Moderate (occurs 1-3 times /year) 3 
Low (occurs 0.1-1 time /year) 2 
Very Low (occurs <0.1 time /year) 1 
Extremely low or not available  0 
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Table II: Hazards in-Scope and Hazards Screened Out 
Hazards in-Scope Hazards Screened Out and Reasons 
Internal flooding; 
Fires; 
Explosions; 
Winter Storms (snow storms, wind 
storms) 
Rain flooding; 
Vandalism 
Earthquakes  
• Because of the low probability of severe earthquakes, 
mitigating the earthquake consequences is not cost-
effective; 
• The efforts for reducing the impacts from earthquakes 
are considered as “Do Not Do”. 
Outbreaks of infectious diseases  
• This hazard is so important and urgent that it is the 
subject of a specific study; 
• The efforts for reducing the impacts from infectious 
diseases are considered as “Do”. 
Cyber attacks  
• They have been handled by another organization. 
  
3.2 Infrastructures and Assets 
3.2.1 Macro-Groups 
The MIT critical infrastructures include the utilities and the emergency and security 
elements (Figure 3).  Electricity is a fundamental utility for the equipment of research 
and education and the facilities of other utilities, such as the production of chilled water. 
Water and steam also provide a necessary utility to MIT and its activities.  For MIT, 
natural gas is a fundamental component of the power generation infrastructure.  Tel-data 
refers to the facilities that support data and telephone systems.  The chilled water 
generation and distribution system is a critical infrastructure for MIT, since chilled water 
is an important utility for the operations and activities of some laboratories and provides 
the resource to cool interior spaces.  HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) 
and Controls refers to the infrastructures that provide both process and temperature 
controls for the comfort of building occupants, as well as research equipment.  The 
emergency and security elements listed in the right hand side of Figure 3 play a major 
role in the emergency planning and response system.  Fire alarm systems, sprinkler 
systems, and the access-control systems provide physical defense to hazards.  When an 
incident occurs in the campus, the Operations Center, the Police, EHS, and the 
Department of Facilities are involved in the emergency response process.  
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Figure 3: MIT Campus Critical Infrastructures 
 
The key assets can be classified into three sectors (Figure 4):  
1. Mission-Related Assets: the assets that are academic and research related;  
2. Support and Service Assets: medical center, administration offices, athletics 
centers, and residential halls;  
3. Other key assets: assets such as the Central Utility Plant which provides multiple 
utilities (electricity, steam, and chilled water) to the whole campus. 
 
Since there are more than 155 buildings on the campus, the assets are further categorized 
into Macro-Groups according to their activities and operations (Figure 4). For example, 
the Animal-Dominant Macro-Group contains the laboratories whose activities are to 
manage animals and improve quality of control. Given a hazard, the consequences for 
different Macro-Groups are different. Data are collected from a representative member of 
the Macro-Group.  
 
 
Figure 4: MIT Campus Key Assets 
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3.2.2 Interdependencies 
Protecting the infrastructures and assets creates major technical challenges, because the 
infrastructures are complex and interconnected systems. Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly8 
propose the following categorization of dependencies, and their definitions are adopted in 
this study:  
• Physical Dependency refers to a physical reliance on material flow from one 
infrastructure to another. The dependency of water pumps on electricity is an 
example of physical dependency.  
• Cyber Dependency refers to a reliance on information transfer between the 
infrastructures. For example, the Human Resources Department depends on the 
Data Center to transfer, update, and store personnel data.  
• Geographic Dependency refers to the dependency that a local environmental 
event affects components across multiple infrastructures due to physical 
proximity. If a utility manhole containing the valves of water pipes, electric power 
lines, and steam lines is flooded, the result could be a loss of several utilities 
because of geographic dependency.  
• Geographic Dependency refers to the dependency between a local event and the 
affect of this event on multiple infrastructures due to physical proximity.  For 
example, if a natural gas main exploded in the vicinity of water and steam mains 
and an electric duct bank, the result could be the loss of three additional utility 
services because of geographic dependency.  
• Logical Dependency refers to the dependency between infrastructures that do not 
fall into one of the above categories.  The dependency among the Institute’s 
police, Environmental Health and Safety Programs, Emergency Operations Center, 
and Department of Facilities, and local fire services when responding to a fire is 
an instance of logical dependency. 
 
The four categories of dependencies enable us to check whether all the dependencies 
have been included into the analysis.  
 
3.3 Scenario Development 
The general risk process shown in Figure 5 provides the basis for constructing the 
scenarios. A scenario starts with an initiating event.  If installed, the physical defense 
system responds right after the initiating event occurs.  Emergency responders, i.e., 
police, EHS, and other departments, act to mitigate the consequences.  In the subsequent 
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events, utility systems such as electricity, water, and steam may fail.  The final 
consequences for the Macro-Group depend on the activities and operations within the 
Macro-Group.  
 
Physical Defense
Fire sprinkler systems;
Emergency generator 
for electricity;
etc.
Utilities
Electricity
Water;
Chilled Water;
Steam;
Natural Gas
etc.
Initiating Events
Flooding;
Power outage;
Fire; 
Explosion;
etc.
Emergency and 
Security Elements
Police;
EHS;
etc.
Assets Macro-Groups
Researchers’ offices;
Labs;
Classrooms;
Medical center;
Residential Halls;
etc.
Impact Evaluation Physical Consequences
 
Figure 5: The Risk Process 
Event Trees are used to describe the scenarios.  The event trees start from the initiating 
events (Table III).  There are two types of initiating events: the initiating events that 
result in campus-wide damage and the initiating events that result in local damage.  The 
former refers to the initiating events that lead to multi-location failures simultaneously; 
the latter refers to the initiating events that occur in a single location and will be bounded 
to local damage unless propagated.  The branches of the tree denote the subsequent 
events. The end node of a branch is the end-state of a scenario.  Figure 6 shows the 
event tree for internal flooding.  This tree, as well as the physical consequences of the 
scenarios, are obtained from historical records and stakeholder input. 
 
 
Table III: Initiating Events 
 
Initiating Event Scope 
Loss of electricity Leading to local damage  
Loss of water Leading to local damage 
Loss of chilled water Leading to local damage  
Loss of steam Leading to local damage  
Loss of natural gas Leading to local damage  
Internal flooding Leading to local damage  
Fire Leading to local damage  
Explosion Leading to local damage 
Campus-wide power outage Leading to Campus-Wide Damage 
Loss of water supply from City Leading to Campus-Wide Damage 
Rain storm Leading to Campus-Wide Damage 
Winter storm Leading to Campus-Wide Damage 
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Initiating 
Event   
Occurs during 
working hours  
(9AM-5PM, 
Monday –Friday 
excluding 
holidays)   
Quick 
emergency 
response 
(within 
5min)   
Propagates 
downstairs   Scenario 
Internal 
Flooding IFλ  Yes 1IFp  Yes 2IFp  Yes 4IFp  S(IF.1) 
      No 1- 4IFp  S(IF.2) 
         
      No 1- 2IFp Yes 5IFp  S(IF.3) 
       No 1- 5IFp  S(IF.4) 
         
   No 1- 1IFp  Yes 3IFp  Yes 6IFp  S(IF.5) 
      No 1-- 6IFp  S(IF.6) 
         
    No 1- 3IFp Yes 7IFp  S(IF.7) 
      No 1- 7IFp  S(IF.8) 
Figure 6: Event Tree and Probabilities for Internal Flooding 
 
To quantify the scenario, probabilities of the events are required. PRA allows the use of 
all of the available evidence, i.e., statistical, experiential, and expert judgment9. The 
following three sources of information were used to evaluate the probabilities in this 
study: 
1. Statistical analysis of the historical incidents: for example, historical records of 
the number of flooding incidents.  
2. Literature reviews: for example, papers evaluating the reliability of fire sprinkler 
systems10. 
3. Stakeholder input: for example, the probability of floods propagating to lower-
level rooms as elicited from the stakeholders.  
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3.4 Data Collection and Stakeholder Input 
To collect data and evaluate the scenario probabilities, we interviewed more than 50 
stakeholders over the course of approximately 30 workshops.  The workshops were 
organized and conducted by a team of analysts.  The preparation for each workshop 
followed five steps11, as discussed below. 
 
Step 1: Interview preparation 
The first step was to select the stakeholders for interview.  The stakeholders were 
selected to represent diverse interests including faculty, emergency coordinators, 
administrative staff, engineers, and others.  Before interviewing the stakeholders, the 
DRU team prepared a document to provide general information about the study to help 
the stakeholders fully understand the context.  
 
Step 2: Introduction to the DRU project and gathering of general information 
Each session started with a presentation on the background, framework, and objectives of 
the project, as well as the benefits to the entire Institute.  In this step, the information 
gathered from the interview was qualitative.  The following questions were asked of the 
stakeholders: 
• Question 1: What are the critical operations and activities in your department? 
• Question 2: What are the critical hazards for your department, e.g., floods, fires, 
explosions, loss of utilities (e.g., power, water, chilled water, steam, natural gas)? 
• Question 3: What are the potential consequences when the incidents occur in your 
department due to the above hazards? 
• Question 4: How do you perceive vandalism for your department?  
• Question 5: What would you do if you had the funding to mitigate the impact?  
  
Step 3: Construction of the initial event trees and description of the physical 
consequences 
The stakeholders were trained on the concept of event trees through examples.  
Scenarios were generated and the physical consequences of the scenarios were gathered 
from the stakeholders.  The interdependencies among the infrastructures, assets, and 
utilities within the department were also determined.  
 
Step 4: Elicitation of probabilities to quantify the scenarios 
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We found that the stakeholders were reluctant to provide probability values.  To assist 
the stakeholders who had no background in probability, some guidance was provided. 
They were encouraged to try to imagine how many times out of 10 (or 100, etc.) would 
an event happen, given the preceding events in the event tree had occurred.  In addition, 
in order to help control anchoring bias, they were asked to provide a lower bound and an 
upper bound, instead of just a best estimate of the probability.  In Figure 6, the 
conditional probabilities for “quick emergency response” and “propagates downstairs” 
were elicited from the stakeholders. .  
 
Step 5: Validation of collected input  
The data that had been collected were sent to the stakeholders.  The stakeholders 
reviewed, discussed, and refined the data until they agreed that the data provided 
satisfactory information.  
3.5 Scenario Impact Evaluation 
3.5.1 Value tree 
Given that a failure occurs, the physical consequences could be material property loss, 
personal injury, environmental pollution due to release of hazardous chemicals, loss of 
research data, or even long-term research damage.  These impacts are not commensurate. 
We evaluated the impact that these consequences have on the decision makers by 
borrowing the idea of objectives hierarchy and utilities from Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory12 .  In this study, we use the terms “impact categories” and “performance 
measures” in lieu of “objectives” because we are interested in the impact that the physical 
consequences have on the decision makers.  We followed the steps below13: 
1. Structuring the impact categories and performance measures; 
2. Weighting objectives and performance measures; 
3. Assessing disutility functions for the performance measures; 
4. Performing consistency checks. 
 
The benefit of an analysis that combines MAUT with PRA is that it provides a 
framework for the stakeholders to discuss the issues in detail, thus enhancing the chances 
that the stakeholders will reach consensus.  It also provides opportunities for the 
stakeholders to create new decision alternatives (in the light of the PRA results) to better 
satisfy their preferences14. 
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An initial value tree (objectives hierarchy) was developed by the MIT Department of 
Facilities (DOF), to prioritize infrastructure renewal projects15.  Later, Apostolakis and 
Lemon16 revised this value tree in order to use it in the context of malicious acts.  The 
DRU’s value tree, shown in Figure 2, is a revision of the Apostolakis and Lemon value 
tree.  The stakeholders agreed with the elements in the value tree, thus only one value 
tree was constructed.  The reason for these revisions is that these investigators were 
dealing with different decision-making problems and their value trees had to reflect the 
preferences of their decision makers and stakeholders. 
 
Step 1: Structuring the impact categories and performance measures  
Three fundamental impact categories are identified (Figure 2): 
1. Health, safety, and environment impact; 
2. Economic impact on property, academic, and Institute operations; 
3. Stakeholder impact.  
 
The objectives are then followed by the identification of the Performance Measures (PM) 
or Attributes, which are used to measure the magnitude of the impact of each scenario. 
Natural scales measure directly the impact level, such as dollars for an economic impact, 
or lost work days for a safety impact. When natural scales do not exist, constructed scales 
are used. Each constructed scale consists of several levels with a description for each 
level. The constructed scales are developed for all the performance measures, as is shown 
in Table IV. 
 
Table IV: Constructed Scales and Disutility Values for DRU’s Value Tree (the Global 
Weight is the product of the PM’s weight and the disutility) 
1 Impact on people  Weight 0.295 
 
PM1: death, injury and illness (excluding psychological impact) on individuals. Major injuries are chronic 
injuries or acute injuries that require hospitalization; Minor injuries are acute injuries that do not require 
hospitalization. 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 4 Catastrophic safety impact 
Hundreds of minor and major injuries and/or 
tens of fatalities 
1 0.295 
 3 Extreme safety impact Tens of major injuries and/or several fatalities 0.67 0.19765
 2 
Major safety impact (need 
hospitalization) 
Tens of minor injuries and/or several major 
injuries 
0.46 0.1357 
 1 Minor safety impact (no need Several minor injuries 0.05 0.01475
 15 of 32
  
hospitalization) 
 0 No safety impact No personal impact 0 0 
      
2 Impact on the environment Weight 0.196 
 PM2: the degree of impact on the environment of scenarios. 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 3 Major Environmental Impact 
Quantity of chemical involved in the incident 
reaches federal regulatory reporting thresholds 
1 0.196 
 2 
Moderate Environmental 
Impact  
Quantity of chemical involved in the incident 
reaches state regulatory reporting thresholds 
0.34 0.06664
 1 Minor Environmental Impact 
Quantity of chemical involved in the incident 
is below regulatory reporting thresholds 
0.04 0.00784
 0 No Environmental Impact   0 0 
      
3 Physical property damage  Weight 0.049 
 PM3: the cost to restore the affected physical property and contents (land, buildings, and equipment). 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 4 
Catastrophic physical property 
and contents damage  
More than $10M 1 0.049 
 3 
Extreme physical property and 
contents damage  
$1M to $10M 0.27 0.01323
 2 
Major physical property and 
contents damage 
$10K to $1M 0.03 0.00147
 1 
Minor physical property and 
contents damage  
Less than 10K 0.01 0.00049
 0 
No physical property and 
contents damage  
 0 0 
      
4 Interruption of Institute academic activities and operations  Weight 0.056 
 
PM4: the length of time needed to restore the academic activities and institute operations (teaching, 
research, and other supporting activities, such as work environment or living accommodations). 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 5 Catastrophic Interruption More than 6 months to restore 1 0.056 
 4 Extreme Interruption  1 to 6 months to restore 0.57 0.03192
 3 Major Interruption  Less than 1 month to restore 0.19 0.01064
 2 Moderate Interruption  Less than 1 week to restore 0.06 0.00336
 1 Minor Interruption  Less than 1 day to restore 0.02 0.00112
 0 No Interruption   0 0 
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5 Intellectual property damage  Weight 0.128 
 PM5: the degree of damage on the affected intellectual and intangible property. 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 3 
Catastrophic Intellectual 
Property Damage  
E.g. Long-term Experiments Lost  1 0.128 
 2 
Major Intellectual Property 
Damage;  
E.g. Artifacts and Rare Documents Lost  0.46 0.05888
 1 
Minor Intellectual Property 
Damage;  
E.g. Non-backed up Electronic Data Lost  0.05 0.0064 
 0 
No Intellectual Property 
Damage  
 0 0 
      
6 Impact on external public image Weight 0.083 
 
PM6: the degree of the negative image held by parents of prospective students, prospective students, 
granting agencies, donors, and regulatory agencies. 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 3 
Major Degree of Adverse 
Publicity  
E.g. National/International Media and affects 
Enrollment, Contributions, Program Funding, 
or Faculty Recruiting  
1 0.083 
 2 
Moderate Degree of Adverse 
Publicity  
E.g. National Media  0.57 0.04731
 1 
Minor Degree of Adverse 
Publicity  
E.g. Local Media  0.06 0.00498
 0 No Adverse Publicity  0 0 
      
7 Impact on internal public image  Weight 0.055 
 
PM7: the degree of the negative image held by parents of existing students, students, faculty, staff, and 
other members of the MIT community. 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 3 
Major Degree of Adverse 
Publicity  
E.g. Petitions, Demonstrations  1 0.055 
 2 
Moderate Degree of Adverse 
Publicity  
E.g. Negative Articles Published  0.34 0.0187 
 1 
Minor Degree of Adverse 
Publicity  
E.g. Verbal Complaints  0.04 0.0022 
 0 No Adverse Publicity   0 0 
      
 17 of 32
  
8 Program affected  Weight 0.138 
 
PM8: the impact on the business, operation, employment, and objectives of the Institute programs 
(departments, laboratories or centers). 
 Level Description Explanation Disutility 
Global 
Weight
 4 
Catastrophic impact on 
Institute programs 
Tens of departments and/or thousands of 
employees are affected  
1 0.138 
 3 
Major impact on Institute 
programs 
Several departments and/or hundreds of 
employees are affected 
0.5 0.069 
 2 
Moderate impact on Institute 
programs 
1 department is affected and/or tens of 
employees are affected 
0.23 0.03174
 1 
Minor impact on Institute 
programs 
1 department is affected and/or several 
employees are affected. The activity can be 
restored by relocation.  
0.02 0.00276
 0 No Impact   0 0 
 
Step 2. Weighting objectives and performance measures 
After constructing the PMs, the next step is to assign weights to the objectives and the 
PMs.  These weights represent the preferences of the decision makers.  When 
expressing preferences among the impact categories and PMs, the decision makers should 
not do so in a general sense, but rather, should be aware of the ranges of the 
consequences.  When the range of the consequences changes, the preferences also 
change.  Therefore, the range of the consequences should be determined before 
weighting. 
 
Many methods are available to elicit the weights from the stakeholders12,17.  In this 
study, a first set of weights is produced by asking the decision makers to perform 
pairwise comparisons as prescribed by the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)18.  These 
preliminary weights are then discussed and possibly modified by the decision makers 
who must ultimately accept the weights as representing their preferences*.  Eliciting 
value judgments is subject to bias and random errors; hence, it is important to check the 
consistency of the elements in the decision analysis.  One advantage of using AHP is 
that it provides a numerical indicator, the Consistency Ratio (CR), which allows us to 
check the consistency of the pairwise comparisons. 
 
                                                 
* The AHP has been criticized in the literature when it is proposed as a decision-making methodology. 
Here, it is used as a convenient means for a preliminary assessment of relative preferences.  The AHP 
results are evaluated and modified, as appropriate, by the decision makers.  The decision-making 
methodology that we use is the MAUT. 
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Step 3. Assessing disutility functions for the performance measures 
Disutilities are measures of the undesirability of the various levels of the PMs†.  The 
AHP is also applied to the performance measures to develop a first set of disutilities19.  
The disutility for the worst impact has the value of unity and the disutility for no impact 
has the value of zero.  The disutility values for the constructed scales are shown in Table 
IV.  
 
Step 4. Performing consistency checks 
Once the value tree is complete, the decision maker should check the preference 
consistency across the PMs.  For example, Level 4 (Extreme Interruption) of the PM 
Interruption of Institute academic activities and operations has a global value of 0.03192. 
Level 3 (Major Impact on Institute Programs) of the PM Program affected has a global 
weight of 0.03174.  These two values suggest that the decision makers should be 
indifferent between these two levels of impact.  If this is not the case, the weights and/or 
the disutilities should be re-examined. 
 
3.5.2 Performance Index 
The Performance Index (PI) of a scenario is the sum of the weights of an individual PM 
multiplied by the disutility value of the level of impact on that PM of this scenario. The 
PI is defined as13: 
    Eq. (1) 
pmK
j i
i
PI w d= ∑ ij
                                                
where 
 PIj is the performance index for scenario j; 
 wi is the weight of the performance measure i; 
 dij is the disutility of the level of the performance measure i impacted by scenario j; 
 Kpm is the number of performance measures 
PIi>PIm means the decision maker assessed the impact (undesirability) of scenario i to be 
higher than that of scenario m.  
 
When the probabilities of the scenarios are available, the Expected Performance Index 
(EPI) can be calculated by the following equation:  
 
† Strictly speaking, the disutility functions are value functions.  
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pmK
j iji
i
PI w d= ∑    Eq. (2) 
where ijd  is the expected disutility of performance measure i for scenario j 
 
In this study, we distinguish between two kinds of risks: random failures and malicious 
acts.  For random failures, the probability of occurrence (or frequency of occurrence) 
can be estimated from the historical records.  Therefore, the expected performance index 
was used to rank the risks from random failures.  However, for malicious acts, the 
probability of attack is not available.  We used performance indices to denote the 
magnitude of such risks.  
 
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) imply that we are using the additive value model.  Although we have 
made every effort to assure utility independence among the PMs, such independence is 
difficult to ensure.  We view this model as an approximation whose results will be 
scrutinized by the decision makers.  As Clemen states12, “in extremely complicated 
situations with many attributes, the additive model may be a useful rough-cut 
approximation.” 
 
3.5.3 Preliminary Risk Ranking  
There are more than 270 scenarios for the risks from random failures (10 Macro-Groups 
with 27 end states for each plus several campus-wide random failures).  Figure 7 ranks 
the risks according to the EPI for the top 80 scenarios from random failures.  The PI 
values are also shown in the figure.  For simplicity, the names of the scenarios, except 
for some examples, are not shown.  According to the EPI magnitude, the scenarios were 
classified in three categories: 
• Category I: high risk and high PI values; 
• Category II: moderate risk and high PI values; 
• Category III: low risk values, i.e. risks with low probability but severe 
consequences 
 
The risks in Category I are the significant ones and include all the campus-wide random 
failures and a few scenarios for local internal flooding.  Category II contains the 
moderate risks.  The low-probability, high-consequence scenarios lie in Category III.  
Since the EPI is calculated from the product of probabilities and a performance index 
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representing the magnitude of the impact of the physical consequences, it makes sense 
that these scenarios have low EPI values because of their very low frequency of 
occurrence; however, these scenarios are still of concern due to their potential high 
impacts. 
 
Figure 8 shows the scenarios ranked according to the PI values. The scenarios for 
vandalism, which can not be shown in Figure 7 because of lack of probabilities of 
occurrence, are shown in Figure 8.  According to the PI values, the risks are classified 
into four categories (Category A; Category B; Category C; Category D).  The scenarios 
for vandalism on the key assets lie in the left side of the figure indicating their significant 
severe damage.  These risks are followed by campus-wide random failures and fire-
related scenarios.  
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Figure 7: Preliminary Risk Ranking According to the EPI for the First 80 Scenarios   
The dark bars show the EPI for campus-wide random failures, the cross-hatched bars show 
the EPI for local-damage random failures, and the grey bars show the PI for the 
corresponding scenarios. 
For example:  
a (the 1st black bar) refers to the scenario for campus-wide rain storm damage;  
b (the 2nd cross-hatched bar) refers to the scenario for internal flooding at a specific MG;  
c (gray bar) refers to the scenario for uncontrolled fire (sprinkler system failure if installed 
or sprinkler system is not installed) with fire alarm at a specific MG.  
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Figure 8: Preliminary Risk Ranking According to PI for the First 120 Scenarios 
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3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The risk ranking may change due to the uncertainty in the parameters (or inputs) in Eq. (1) 
and Eq. (2).  A sensitivity analysis was performed on the frequencies of occurrence and 
the probabilities used in the event trees.  The distribution of the frequency of occurrence 
was assumed to be lognormal and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the lognormal 
distribution were obtained from the stakeholder inputs.  For the parameters elicited from 
the stakeholders, the uncertainty was modeled by a uniform distribution or triangular 
distribution, and their minimum and maximum values came from the stakeholder inputs.  
 
The sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the top uncertain parameter was the frequency 
of the initiating event.  The risk ranking was very sensitive to this parameter.  The 
probability of failure of physical systems, such as emergency generators, backup batteries, 
fire sprinkler systems, and fire alarm systems, contributed little to the variation of ranking. 
This was because of the high reliability of these systems and the narrow range of the 
uncertain values.  
 
3.5.5 Observations and Insights 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 lead us to the following observations: 
• Regardless of whether the probabilities of the scenarios are considered, the 
campus-wide failures dominate the local-damage failures.  Campus-wide failures 
are shown in Category I within Figure 7 and in Category A within Figure 8, at the 
left side of each of the figures.  
• If the probabilities of the scenarios are considered, the risk from internal flooding 
ranks the highest among the local-damage risks in Category I.  If the 
probabilities of the scenarios are taken out, most of these risks move from 
Category I to Category C within Figure 8, while a few of them move to Category 
B. 
• For the local-damage failures, the risks from uncontrolled fires without fire alarm 
rank very low (in Category III within Figure 7) if the probabilities of the scenarios 
are considered.  However, these risks rank the highest among all the local-
damage risks in Category A within Figure 8, because of their catastrophic 
consequences.  
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• Vandalism, whose probability of attack is not available, dominates random 
failures (see Figure 8) in terms of the consequences.  Vandalism on key assets 
whose failure could lead to campus-wide damage dominates the campus-wide 
damage scenarios from random failures.  
 
The insights from the risk rankings are: 
• When the risks have approximately the same values (EPI or PI), i.e., they are 
adjacent in the ranking, it is hard to judge whether one risk is higher than the 
other, since the slight difference in risk value may come from uncertainty in the 
parameters and variability in subjective judgments.  Therefore, it not useful to 
emphasize the exact ranking order.  
• This study has demonstrated that purely ranking the risks according to the 
expected consequences could prevent one from considering the potential impact 
of rare events.  Thus, rare but catastrophic scenarios should not be discounted 
but evaluated to determine priority over other risks and in the context of what 
could be done to mitigate or eliminate the risk.  For example, the risk from an 
uncontrolled fire in a building (in Category III in Figure 7, yet in Category A in 
Figure 8) could be reduced by installing fire sprinklers or removing or controlling 
fuel sources.  These mitigation measures could cost much less than the cost due 
to an uncontrolled fire and such a beneficial outcome might not be realized unless 
low expected consequence events were discussed. 
• Vandalism can only be addressed in the PI ranking, since the probability of attack 
is not available.  The consequences from vandalism on some key assets can be 
comparable with (or even higher than) the consequences of rare but catastrophic 
risks, for example, the scenario uncontrolled fire without fire alarm.  
4 Deliberation 
The National Research Council (NRC) recommends an analytic-deliberative process in 
the decision-making process.  Deliberation, as defined by the NRC7, is “any formal or 
informal process for communication and collective consideration of issues.  
Participants in deliberation discuss, ponder, exchange observations and views, reflect 
upon information and judgments concerning matters of mutual interest and attempt to 
persuade each other.”  The whole idea of deliberation is to force the stakeholders to 
think about the issues in detail by way of logic and a structured format.  Thus, a truly 
wise decision can be reached. 
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An iterative deliberation process was used extensively in every stage of the process. 
Through deliberation, the stakeholders achieved consensus on the elements in the value 
tree.  After the risk assessment was completed a deliberative process was used to 
determine the final risk ranking.  In this deliberative process, the results were 
scrutinized and their validity was evaluated through discussion, reflection, and 
communication.  The deliberation on the results is a very important step for the whole 
study because it increases understanding, overcomes the causes for mistrust, and brings 
new insights.  
 
Three types of participants were involved in this final deliberation process: stakeholders, 
the analyst, and a facilitator14.  The stakeholders were told that the purpose of the 
analysis was not to simply produce the results but, rather, to help them understand the 
relative value and quality of the results, and develop insights from these results.  The 
analyst not only presented what the risks were and what their ranking was, but also 
explained why the risks had such a ranking.  For example, the risks from internal 
flooding rank high for the following reasons:  
1. The frequency of internal flooding incidents is about 10 times that of other 
initiating events.  
2. There is no centralized campus-wide physical prevention system for flooding, 
unlike fires for which sprinkler systems and alarm systems are installed. 
3. The consequences of flooding could be very high.  
 
Deliberation was an interactive process.  The stakeholders raised questions regarding the 
analysis, methodology, and the results.  They also expressed their opinions of the results. 
For example, a stakeholder mentioned that the potential impact of the scenario Animal-
Dominant Macro-Group loses chilled water supply on hot days is more severe than the 
potential impact of the scenario Animal-Dominant Macro-Group loses steam supply on 
cold days; however, in the preliminary risk ranking, these two scenarios had the same 
ranking.  After going back and checking the data, we found that the reason for this 
ranking was because of the discrete constructed scales (for example, there are only five 
levels for the PM physical property damage), therefore, these two scenarios cannot be 
differentiated by their PI values.  
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5 Risk Management 
Risk management requires an understanding of hazards, reliable information, teamwork 
on the part of many segments of society, organizational entities capable of implementing 
actions, and rigorous supporting technical analyses 20 .  We believe that prudent 
application of risk management will ensure the continuity of MIT’s research and 
education mission by: 
1. Lessening damage by accident or failure;  
2. Making potential targets less attractive to malicious acts, thereby reducing the 
likelihood that those specific targets will be attacked;  
3. Reducing the time necessary for recovery; and 
4. Lessening the effects of collateral and cascading damage.  
 
Potential risk mitigation strategies could include both engineering/technical and 
management solutions.  Engineering solutions such as upgrading fire alarm and 
sprinkler systems would mitigate the physical property damages that could potentially 
result from a fire, while management solutions calling for periodically run fire evacuation 
drills would mitigate the potential for injuries. 
 
While insurance provides the ability to offset the risk associated with a hazard to a third 
party for a fee, one should consider that the proceeds from a claim in context of the sum 
of all damages less deductible, could be insufficient if intellectual property is lost or 
experiments are delayed.  This is particularly true for experiments requiring animals as 
experimental subjects, multi-generational samples, or difficult to reproduce cell lines. 
Therefore, the philosophy of risk management at MIT is straightforward; understand 
dominant hazards and their potential impact well enough to determine whether the hazard 
could be prevented from occurring and to put in place physical protective barriers and 
systems and policies, procedures, and practices to prevent and/or mitigate the impact of 
those hazards, whether intentional or natural.  Table V displays internal flooding, one of 
the credible risk exposures identified by this study, in the context of the risk scenario, 
magnitude of impact, root cause, existing mitigation plans and actions, and preliminary 
mitigation strategies.  The purpose of the tabular format is to display all risks 
consistently so that deliberation and prioritization, ultimately the funding and 
implementation of mitigation efforts proceeds quickly.  Similar entries were developed 
for other risk exposures.  
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Risk management is also useful when one attempts to implement measures necessary to 
mitigate high consequence low probability events. There are at least two ways to proceed:  
1. Decide that high consequence events take absolute priority over lower consequence 
events and  
2. Learn more about the risks and selectively mitigate components of the risk.  
 
While both options are valid, the first can cause one to spend time, money, and effort on 
impacts that may never occur.  The value of the second is best described by way of an 
example.  Consider the scenario of an uncontrolled fire.  In this instance, an 
uncontrolled fire refers to a fire that takes place in a space that is intentionally not 
protected by fire sprinklers.  An example of the questions one should ask during 
deliberation is: are the spaces around the un-sprinkled space served by fire sprinklers?  
If yes, then the fire could be contained and the impact would be less than had the fire 
occurred in a building that does not have fire sprinklers.  The point being that by 
understanding high-consequence low-probability events lower cost mitigation 
possibilities could emerge. 
 
 
 
 
Table V: Risk Management for Internal Flooding 
 
Risk Risk Explanation Causes 
Existing Mitigation 
Plans and Actions 
Preliminary 
Mitigation 
Strategies 
Internal 
flooding 
Internal flooding 
ranks high because 
of the inherent 
opportunity for 
flooding in buildings 
containing many 
pipes and the 
frequency and 
magnitude of 
flooding experienced 
on campus. Currently 
there is no campus-
wide physical 
defense system to 
prevent internal 
flooding or mitigate 
its damage 
Faulty or failed 
plumbing, 
overflowing drains, 
condensation, faulty 
or accidentally 
damaged fire 
sprinkler systems 
1. Plumbers and 
custodians directed 
to scene by way of 
radio and paging 
system 
 
2. Water level 
detection system 
installed in select 
locations 
 
3. Call-in process for 
additional help if 
needed 
 
4. On-campus 
personnel repair 
1. Seal penetrations, 
cracks, and holes 
through floors; 
prioritize according 
to potential for 
consequences, e.g. 
floors above shared 
experimental facility 
 
2. Install check 
valves where they 
could be effective 
 
3. Increase level of 
urgency of repair 
requests associated 
with potential pipe 
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One shared facility 
contains many very 
expensive 
experimental devices 
and serves hundreds 
of researchers 
annually. Thus 
potential for delays 
in research and high 
costs associated with 
damage to equipment 
and the loss of 
research income. 
systems when failure 
is observed and 
reported 
 
5. Fire sprinkler 
water flow alarm 
system alerts central 
operations center 
personnel of water 
flowing through 
sprinkler pipes 
whether or not a fire 
is present 
 
6. Sectional valves, 
where present, 
prevent impact due 
to accidental 
breakage of fire 
sprinkler heads or 
piping in active 
construction sites 
breaks 
 
4. Verify call-in 
procedures and 
policies for all 
personnel associated 
with flood and storm 
damage response 
 
5. Study need for 
additional water 
detectors 
 
6. Install sectional 
valves on fire 
sprinkler systems 
 
7. Require that 
renovation 
contractors submit 
and adhere to an 
agreed upon flood 
mitigation plan 
 
8. Insert text in 
design guidelines 
that addresses flood 
mitigation in the 
early stages of design 
 
6 Summary 
Confronting the natural hazards, human-induced accidents, and malicious acts, we have 
developed a systematic method to assess and rank the risks in a community.  This 
method is based on a formal, self-consistent decision-making process that integrates 
probabilistic risk assessment, decision analysis, expert judgment, and other disciplines.  
A scenario-based model is implemented to show where the risks are and their magnitudes, 
how the initiating events evolve into the undesirable consequences, and how to generate 
mitigation alternatives to handle the risks.  A value tree, based on Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory, is used to capture the stakeholders’ preferences in the analysis.  The risks from 
the random failures are ranked according to their Expected Performance Index (EPI).  
The risks are also prioritized according to Performance Index (PI) to include the 
malicious acts from which the risks can not be captured in EPI as the probability of attack 
is not available.  
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By implementing this framework in a test-bed (the MIT campus), it has been 
demonstrated that this framework is reasonable, practical, transparent, and can be used by 
other similar communities.  For example, the delineation of Macro-Groups allows for 
the often decentralized elements of a university’s infrastructure and key assets to be 
aggregated into clusters that are readily recognizable from one university to another. 
Furthermore, these Macro-Groups are defined with sufficient granularity that the concept 
can be transferred to perform multi-hazard vulnerability assessments at other 
decentralized entities such as research and teaching hospitals, government research 
laboratories, and similarly sized municipalities. 
 
Another contribution of the research is that it provides a framework for the development 
of a risk-informed decision strategy.  Compared to the risk-based approach which relies 
heavily on technical expertise, this approach includes not only a formal, quantitative, and 
replicable analysis, but also a deliberative process to capture the factors that could not be 
addressed in the analysis.  Furthermore, the methodology enables the stakeholders to 
provide additional input that reflects the stakeholders’ preferences in the analysis.  It 
also provides a platform for the stakeholders to discuss and communicate during the 
decision process.  
  
The limitations of the study are the following:  
y This study focuses on high-level risk assessment.  Only significant scenarios are 
captured in the scenario development.  As a starting point of continuous risk 
management, it has provided satisfactory results in this phase.  We anticipate 
that once the decision has been made to manage some risks, more detailed 
scenarios should be developed for the selected risks.  
y In terms of utilities (infrastructures), we only assessed the risks for the utility end-
users and the utility sources (generators).  For the infrastructure network, like 
our test-bed, the analysis has provided an overview of the risks across the utility 
network.  However, for a larger and more complex infrastructure network, 
rigorous network analyses should be implemented to analyze the critical locations 
(nodes) in the network.  We anticipate the ideas generated from this study will 
help to assess the risks due to multiple hazards for these critical locations.  
y The existence of incompleteness and uncertainties may weaken the results of the 
model.  In this study, the potential uncertainties are: the possibly incomplete 
scenarios, the probabilities of the scenarios, the elements in the value tree (for 
example, constructed scales are used instead of continuous disutility functions), 
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and the conservative estimation of the physical consequences.  It is also assumed 
that the occurrence of failures is homogeneously distributed across the campus, 
and that the locations with similar operations and activities have the same 
consequences in terms of the same scenario.  These assumptions may also lead 
to uncertainties.  The sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the frequency of 
occurrence is the top uncertainty parameter.  We anticipate the uncertainties will 
decrease through further analysis in future work.  
 
Acknowledgement 
We thank the Federal Emergency Management Agency for their consideration and 
funding of the study and results presented herein.   Additionally, we extend our 
appreciation to the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, and its 
representative Mr. Scott MacLeod, who offered valuable guidance in the execution of this 
study.  We also thank William McShea and Gerald Isaacson for their participation in 
this project.  Finally, the DRU project team thanks the Institute’s stakeholders and 
decision makers along with MIT’s leadership for their insightful, frank discussions and 
commitment to this project, without which the vulnerability assessment and analysis 
would not have been possible. 
References  
 
                                                 
1 M. C. Comerio, V. Bertero and J. M. Quigley (2000), The Economic Benefits of a Disaster 
Resistant University: Earthquake Loss Estimation for UC Berkeley, IURD WP #2000-02, 
University of California, Berkeley, CA.  
 
2 M. C. Comerio, J. C. Stallmeyer, Y. I. Kim, K. Hung, S. Lau, R. Dooley, R. Smith and J. I. Kim 
(2003), Seismic Protection of Laboratory Contents: The UC Berkeley Science Building Case Stud, 
Working Paper 2003-02, University of California, Berkeley, CA.  
 
3 UNCW (2003), The University of North Carolina at Wilmington Hazard Assessment, 
University of North Carolina, NC. 
 
4 H. K. Florig, M. G. Morgan, K. M. Morgan, K. E. Jenni, B. Fischhoff, P. S. Fischbeck and M. 
L. DeKay (2001), “A Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks (I): Overview and Test Bed 
Development”, Risk Analysis 21(5): 913-921. 
 
5 K. M. Morgan, M. L. DeKay, P. S. Fischbeck, M. G. Morgan, B. Fischhoff and H. K. Florig 
(2001), “A Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks (II): Evaluation of Validity and Agreement 
among Risk Managers”, Risk Analysis 21(5): 923-937. 
 30 of 32
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 C. J. Andrews, D. Hassenzahl and B. Johnson (2003), Legitimizing Uncertain Risk Information, 
http://radburn.rutgers.edu/andrews/projects/njcrp/ACSP03.pdf. 
 
7 National Research Council (1996), Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society, National Academy Press, Washington, DC. 
 
8 S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom and T. K. Kelly (2001), “Identifying, Understanding, and 
Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies”, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6): 11-
25. 
 
9 G. E. Apostolakis (1990), “The Concept of Probability in Safety Assessments of Technological 
Systems”, Science 250: 1359-1364. 
 
10  R. W. Bukowski, E. K. Budnick, and C. F. Schemel (1999), “Estimates of the Operational 
Reliability of Fire Protection Systems”, International Conference on Fire Research and 
Engineering (ICFRE3), Third (3rd). Proceedings. Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE), 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and International Association of Fire 
Safety Science (IAFSS). October 4-8, 1999, Chicago, IL, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 
Boston, MA, 87-98 pp, 1999. 
 
11 R. L. Keeney and D. von Winterfeldt (1991), “Eliciting Probabilities from Experts in Complex 
Technical Problems”, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 38(3): 191-201. 
 
12 R. T. Clemen (1996), Making Hard Decisions-An Introduction to Decision Analysis, Second 
Edition, Duxbury Press, Belmont, California. 
 
13 R. Weil and G. E. Apostolakis (2001), “A Methodology for the Prioritization of Operating 
Experience in Nuclear Power Plants”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 74: 23-42. 
 
14 G. E. Apostolakis and S. E. Pickett (1998), “Deliberation: Integrating Analytical Results into 
Environmental Decisions Involving Multiple Stakeholders”, Risk Analysis 18(5): 621-634. 
 
15 D. M. Karydas and J. F. Gifun (2006), “A Method for the Efficient Prioritization of 
Infrastructure Renewal Projects”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91: 84-99. 
 
16 G. E. Apostolakis and D. M. Lemon (2005), “A Screening Methodology for the Identification 
and Ranking of Infrastructure Vulnerabilities Due to Terrorism”, Risk Analysis 25(2): 361-376. 
 
17 R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa (1993), Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value 
Tradeoffs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
 
18 T. L. Saaty (2000), Fundamentals of Decision Making and Priority Theory with the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
 
19 W.R. Hughes (1986), “Deriving Utilities Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process”, Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences 20(6): 393-395. 
 
20 J. Garrick, J. E. Hall, M. Kilger, J. C. McDonald, T. O’Toole, P. S. Probst, E. R. Parker, R. 
Rosenthal, A. W. Trivelpiece, L. A. Van Arsdale and E. L. Zebroski (2004), “Confronting the 
 31 of 32
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Risks of Terrorism: Making the Right Decisions”, Reliability Engineering & System Safety 86(2): 
129-176. 
 32 of 32
